A more independent judiciary based on an equally independent Judicial Appointments Commission is a categorical imperative for democratic praxis in India
With a proactive role based on the power of judicial review, the higher
judiciary in India has attained an unprecedented significance. However,
in the areas of judicial management and appointments, there is little
scope for euphoria. In selecting judges for the constitutional courts,
the collegium system has exposed itself. In the words of Justice Krishna
Iyer: “There is no structure to hear the public in the process of
selection. No principle is laid down, no investigation is made, and a
sort of anarchy prevails.”
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar warned against the system of judges selecting judges
by saying that “to allow the Chief Justice practically a veto upon the
appointment of judges is really to transfer the authority to the Chief
Justice which we are not prepared to vest in the President or the
Government of the day”. However, no sane criticism of the collegium
system would advocate for restoration of political supremacy in judicial
appointment. The country is presently seriously debating on the issue
and attempting legislation.
My recent visit to the U.K. Supreme Court reminded me of the progress
that a modern constitutional democracy has made in judicial management
in general and appointments of judges in particular. India cannot afford
to ignore the quality of the British judiciary in the ongoing efforts
to bring radical changes, especially because we have adopted the
Anglo-Saxon system.
The judges in the higher judiciary in the U.K. are appointed on the
basis of recommendations made by the independent Judicial Appointments
Commission (JAC). Regional representation in appointments is ensured.
The Judicial Commission has a representative and participative
character. The procedures are transparent. There is no predominance
either of the judiciary or of the executive. There is no ‘collegium
syndrome’, much less any ‘kin syndrome’. Nor is there any political
highhandedness.
The JAC is an independent body which is given the task of selecting
candidates for judicial offices in courts and tribunals in England,
Wales and also tribunals which have jurisdiction over Scotland and
Northern Ireland. There is fair and open competition which ensures
assessment of inter se merit. The process is lengthy and complex. However, it is more effective and accountable.
The Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 was recently amended by the
Judicial Appointments Regulations, 2013. There are 15 members in the JAC
including the Chairman. All of them, except the three judicial members
are selected through open competition. Apart from the members from
judiciary and legal profession, there are also judicial officers who are
not legally qualified and also eminent persons from the public.
There is a well-designed and systematic selection process for induction
of Judges at all tribunals and courts including the High Court. It
involves the request for vacancy position, advertisement, receipt of
applications, shortlisting, references, candidate selection, panel
decision, statutory consultation, checks, decisions on selection,
submission of report to the Lord Chancellor and finally the procedure
for quality assurance which includes review of the progression of the
candidates and observation of the interviews and test results.
The statutory consultation is a mandatory requirement as per the CRA. It
is an integral part of the selection process. After the finalisation of
selection, the JAC recommends the name of the candidate to the
appropriate authority. JAC thus selects the Lord Chief Justice, Heads of
Division and the Lord Justice of Appeal.
Selection to Supreme Court
However, the JAC on its own cannot select justices for the U.K. Supreme Court. It is governed by Sections 25 to 31 and Schedule 8 of the Constitutional Reforms Act 2005 as amended. Sections 50 to 52 of the amended Act say about the minimum benchmark for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court. Experience at the bar is given due importance. The Lord Chancellor should constitute the Selection Commission by addressing a letter to the president of the Court who chairs the Commission. The president should also nominate a senior judge in the U.K., who should not be, however, a Justice of the Supreme Court.
However, the JAC on its own cannot select justices for the U.K. Supreme Court. It is governed by Sections 25 to 31 and Schedule 8 of the Constitutional Reforms Act 2005 as amended. Sections 50 to 52 of the amended Act say about the minimum benchmark for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court. Experience at the bar is given due importance. The Lord Chancellor should constitute the Selection Commission by addressing a letter to the president of the Court who chairs the Commission. The president should also nominate a senior judge in the U.K., who should not be, however, a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Thus the system in the U.K. inherently guards against the vices of the
collegium system. There is a member of JAC from England and Wales,
Judicial Appointments Board (JAB) in Scotland and JAC in Northern
Ireland. Again, and significantly, at least one of the representatives
of such a commission should be a layman. Thus the judicial appointment
is no more a matter concerning only lawyers or judges. It is meant for
the public, for there is no republic without the public.
In the process of appointment to the U.K. Supreme Court also there is a
mandatory consultation process with a group that includes senior judges
in the Supreme Court to the Chancellors of the High Court and the
President of the Family Division. Likewise, there should be consultation
with the Lord Chancellor, the First Minister in Scotland, the First
Minister in Wales and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Thus
regional representation is ensured.
The report should be finally submitted to the Lord Chancellor who should
again consult with the judges and politicians who are already consulted
by the Commission. Only thereafter the Lord Chancellor can recommend
the name of the candidate to the Prime Minister who in turn should
advice the Queen to issue formal orders of appointment. Consultation in
the U.K. does not mean concurrence by the judges as it occurs in India
after the Supreme Court judgments in 2nd Judges’ case (1993) and the 3rd
Judges’ case (1998). And it makes a very big difference.
India has now accepted the need for a Judicial Appointments Commission
in principle as evident from the cabinet decision on August 23, 2013
that was followed by introduction of a Bill in that direction. But
whether the composition of the Committee, with two “eminent jurists”, is
vulnerable to political intrusion that could jeopardise the
independence of the judiciary, is a fundamental question being widely
asked.
We should restructure the committee by enhancing its democratic
character and by ensuring procedural fairness. We cannot, however ignore
the global trend in the realm of judicial appointments which is more
towards independent commissions. The United States Institute of Peace
has published a ‘Report on judicial appointments and judicial
independence’.
It says that judicial council “promises to be a happy medium” between
the extremes where neither the judges nor the political heads have the
final say. A duly constituted commission is capable of reconciling the
need for independence with accountability. About 60 per cent of the
countries have adopted the system of judicial council in some form,
according to the said report.
Screening of cases
In sharp contrast to the Indian situation, there are days when no cases are listed at all in the U.K. Supreme Court. Appeal is not a matter of routine. Nor it is a matter of right. Leave to appeal is not automatic. Only when there is a substantial legal or constitutional issue, the Supreme Court entertains the appeal. As such there is no docket explosion, as we face.
In sharp contrast to the Indian situation, there are days when no cases are listed at all in the U.K. Supreme Court. Appeal is not a matter of routine. Nor it is a matter of right. Leave to appeal is not automatic. Only when there is a substantial legal or constitutional issue, the Supreme Court entertains the appeal. As such there is no docket explosion, as we face.
However, the situations are incomparable in terms of population and
other socio-economic factors. Therefore, the Indian Supreme Court cannot
probably emulate the British path in this respect. Our Supreme Court,
on the other hand, needs to be a common man’s court, and there should be
easy access to the system for the ordinary citizen as visualised by the
framers of the Indian Constitution.
Incidentally, one may see that the judges of the U..K Supreme Court do
not wear official robes during court proceedings. Lawyers also could
dispense with official robes on mutual consent. Proceedings of cases of
public importance or constitutional relevance are telecast live. As such
there is little scope for media trial. These are all small but
significant instances which reflect institutional democracy and
transparency. The openness of the system is ensured in all facets of
judicial process, starting from the selection. Presently there are
twelve Justices in the U.K. Supreme Court. Lord Neuberger is the
president and Lady Hale is the deputy president in the bench.
John Rawls rightly said that justice is fairness. The Supreme Court of
the U.K. simply demonstrates it. A more independent judiciary based on
an equally independent Judicial Appointments Commission is a categorical
imperative for democratic praxis in India.
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